

Message Text

SECRET

PAGE 01 MBFR V 00443 01 OF 04 182002Z
ACTION ACDA-12

INFO OCT-01 EUR-12 ISO-00 ACDE-00 CIAE-00 NSAE-00
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TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3114
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INFO ALL MBFR MISSIONS IMMEDIATE
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SMEMBASSY BELGRADE 202
AMEMBASSY BERN
AMEMBASSY LISBON
AMEMBASSY LUXEMBOURG
AMEMBASSY PRAGUE
AMEMBASSY SOFIA
AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM
AMEMBASSY REYKJAVIK

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 4 MBFR VIENNA 0443

FROM US REP MBFR

USSALTTWO

USMISSION NATO IMMEDIATE. ALL OTHER MBFR MISSIONS ROUTINE

E O 11652: GDS
TAGS: PARM, NATO
SUBJ: MBFR NEGOTIATIONS: AD HOC GROUP REPORT TO THE NAC ON
EASTERN JUNE 8 PROPOSALS AND DATA

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 MBFR V 00443 01 OF 04 182002Z

AT ITS JULY 18 MEETING, THE AD HOC GROUP APPROVED THE
FOLLOWING WRITTEN REPORT TO THE NAC ON THE EAST'S JUNE 8
PROPOSALS AND ON THE PRESENT STATUS OF THE DATA DISCUSSION:

BEGIN TEXT:

WRITTEN REPORT TO THE NAC ON EASTERN JUNE 8

PROPOSALS AND DATA

I. EASTERN JUNE 8 PROPOSALS

THIS SECTION OF THE REPORT SUPPLEMENTS EARLIER AHG REPORTS ON THE EASTERN PROPOSALS OF JUNE 8. IT CONTAINS ADDITIONAL INDIVIDUAL POINTS WHICH EASTERN REPRESENTATIVES HAVE CONFIRMED OR CLARIFIED SINCE THE SUBMISSION OF THE AD HOC GROUP'S WRITTEN REPORTS TO THE COUNCIL OF 9 JUNE AND 14 JUNE REGARDING THE 8 JUNE EASTERN PROPOSALS. THESE POINTS ARE AS FOLLOWS:

(1) UNIT LIMITATIONS WOULD BE APPLIED ONLY TO THE LARGEST-SIZE UNITS OF THE TYPE REDUCED BY EACH INDIVIDUAL DIRECT PARTICIPANT. BUT PARTICIPANTS WOULD APPARENTLY BE PERMITTED TO INCREASE THE NUMBER OF ALL OTHER UNITS OF ANY SIZE. COMMENT: IT SHOULD BE NOTED THAT DETAILS OF THE PRACTICAL OPERATION AND THE EFFECTS OF SUCH LIMITATIONS REMAIN UNCLEAR.

(2) THE DISPOSITION OF ARMAMENTS AND EQUIPMENT OF WITHDRAWN US UNITS, OTHER THAN THE SPECIFIED US NUCLEAR ELEMENTS, WOULD BE LEFT TO THE DISCRETION OF US AUTHORITIES. COMMENT: THIS, OF COURSE, IS A POINT IN THE WESTERN PROGRAM.

(3) THERE WOULD BE A SEPARATE CEILING ON AIR FORCE MANPOWER SET AT 200,000 MEN.

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 03 MBFR V 00443 01 OF 04 182002Z

(4) MAINTENANCE OF THE AIR MANPOWER CEILING IN THE EVENT OF FURTHER, UNILATERAL REDUCTIONS WOULD BE SUBJECT TO THE SAME "50 PCT RULE" AS THE 700,000 MAN GROUND FORCE CEILING. HOWEVER, INDIVIDUAL PARTICIPANTS COULD EXCEED THE ORIGINAL LEVEL OF THEIR AIR FORCE MANPOWER IN MAKING UP FOR THE POST-AGREEMENT UNILATERAL AIR MANPOWER REDUCTIONS BY OTHER PARTICIPANTS ON THEIR SIDE, AS LONG AS THEY DID NOT EXCEED THE COMBINED TOTAL OF THEIR AIR AND GROUND MANPOWER PRIOR TO REDUCTIONS.

(5) THE ADDITIONAL US AND SOVIET REDUCTIONS REQUIRED IN PHASE II WOULD BE TAKEN IN THE SECOND STAGE OF PHASE II.

(6) SOVIET TANKS TO BE WITHDRAWN IN PHASE I WOULD BE THOSE OF THE TWO DIVISIONS TO BE WITHDRAWN PLUS THOSE OF ADDITIONAL TANK UNITS EQUAL IN NUMBER TO THOSE OF A SOVIET TANK DIVISION. COMMENT: SOVIET REPLIES ON THIS POINT MAKE IT APPEAR THAT THE TWO COMPLETE DIVISIONS WHOSE WITHDRAWAL IS PROPOSED WOULD BE TANK DIVISIONS.

(7) THE SOVIET INFANTRY COMBAT VEHICLES TO BE WITHDRAWN IN PHASE I WOULD BE BMPs.

(8) THERE IS NO SPECIFIC PROVISION OR REQUIREMENT IN THE EASTERN PROPOSALS FOR FURTHER US AND SOVIET ARMAMENT REDUCTIONS IN PHASE II, ALTHOUGH THE POSSIBILITY OF FURTHER NEGOTIATED ARMAMENT REDUCTIONS IS NOT EXCLUDED.

(9) THERE IS NO REQUIREMENT FOR PHASE II US REDUCTIONS BY BRIGADES OR SOVIET PHASE II REDUCTIONS BY DIVISIONS, ALTHOUGH THE EAST CONSIDERS THAT PHASE II REDUCTIONS BY THESE COUNTRIES SHOULD BE IN THE FORM OF UNITS AND SUBUNITS.

(10) ARMAMENTS REDUCED BY WESTERN EUROPEAN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS COULD BE STORED IN THE AREA WHERE THEY WOULD BE SUBJECT TO SOME FORM OF NUMERICAL LIMITATION ON THE TOTAL AMOUNT
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 04 MBFR V 00443 01 OF 04 182002Z

OF SUCH ARMAMENTS IN BOTH ACTIVE DUTY UNITS AND STORAGE.

SECRET

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SECRET

PAGE 01 MBFR V 00443 02 OF 04 182013Z
ACTION ACDA-12

INFO OCT-01 EUR-12 ISO-00 ACDE-00 CIAE-00 NSAE-00
NSCE-00 SSO-00 ICAE-00 INRE-00 H-01 INR-10 IO-13
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O R 181817Z JUL 78
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SECDEF WASHDC
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AMEMBASSY BELGRADE
AMEMBASSY BERN
AMEMBASSY LISBON
AMEMBASSY LUXEMBOURG
AMEMBASSY PRAGUE
AMEMBASSY SOFIA

AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM
AMEMBASSY REYKJAVIK

S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 4 MBFR VIENNA 0443

(11) THE SPECIFICATION OF ARMAMENTS TO BE REDUCED AND
OF THE NATURE OF THE LIMITATION ON THESE ARMAMENTS, WHETHER
INDIVIDUAL OR COLLECTIVE, IS A SUBJECT FOR PHASE II NEGOTIATIONS.

(12) ARMAMENTS WHICH ARE NOT REDUCED BY AGREEMENT WILL
NOT BE LIMITED IN ANY WAY. COMMENT: THIS TOO IS A CONCEPT
UNDERLYING THE WESTERN APPROACH.

II. PRESENT STATUS OF THE DATA ISSUE

1. SINCE THE EAST TABLED ITS JUNE 8 PROPOSALS, WESTERN
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 MBFR V 00443 02 OF 04 182013Z

REPRESENTATIVES HAVE POINTED OUT TO THE EAST THAT THE EAST'S
ACCEPTANCE OF THE CONCEPT OF PARITY DOES NOT YET REPRESENT
PRACTICAL PROGRESS BECAUSE IT IS BASED ON EASTERN DATA, BUT THAT
THIS EASTERN MOVE ON PRINCIPLE MAKES THE RESOLUTION OF THE DATA
QUESTION ALL THE MORE URGENT. EASTERN REACTIONS SUGGEST THAT
EASTERN REPRESENTATIVES RECOGNIZE THIS FACT. BUT THEY HAVE GIVEN
NO INDICATION OF CHANGE IN THEIR POSITION ON DATA OR THAT THEY
HAVE USED A DEFINITION OF FORCES TO BE COUNTED WHICH DIFFERS FROM
THAT USED BY THE WEST. INSTEAD, THEY HAVE REPEATEDLY CHARGED THAT
THE WEST HAS NOT AND CANNOT PROVE ITS CLAIM THAT THERE IS A SUBSTAN-
TIAL EASTERN NUMERICAL SUPERIORITY IN MILITARY MANPOWER. MOREOVER,
EASTERN REPRESENTATIVES HAVE LATELY BEGUN OPENLY TO CHALLENGE
THE WEST TO PROVIDE AND EXPLAIN ITS ESTIMATES OF THE MANPOWER
STRENGTH OF INDIVIDUAL EASTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS.

2. AS THE AD HOC GROUP POINTED OUT IN ITS REPORT OF
19 APRIL TO THE COUNCIL, THE EXCHANGE OF FURTHER DATA ON GROUND
FORCE MANPOWER IN MARCH THIS YEAR SHOWED AN UNEVEN DISTRIBUTION
OF THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN WESTERN AND EASTERN DATA ON WARSAW
PACT MILITARY MANPOWER, WITH DISPROPORTIONATELY LARGE DISCREPANCIES
FOR SOVIET AND POLISH FORCES. EXTENSIVE DISCUSSION OF THE DATA
SINCE THEN HAS PROVIDED FURTHER CONFIRMATION THAT, FOR THE
SOVIET FORCES, THESE DISCREPANCIES LIE IN MAJOR FORMATIONS,
AND FOR THE POLISH FORCES, IN THE RESIDUAL CATEGORY.

3. ONE ITEM ENTAILING POTENTIAL ADJUSTMENT IN WESTERN
FIGURES ON POLISH FORCES HAS COME TO LIGHT AS THE RESULT OF
WESTERN QUESTIONING. ACCORDING TO EASTERN ACCOUNTS, WHICH
MUST BE CHECKED FURTHER, THERE ARE NO RAILROAD CONSTRUCTION
OR ENGINEER CONSTRUCTION UNITS IN THE POLISH REGULAR FORCES
BUT ONLY IN THE POLISH UNITS OF TERRITORIAL DEFENSE. NATO
FIGURES HOWEVER, CURRENTLY CARRY THESE UNITS AS SUBORDINATE

TO THE POLISH MINISTRY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE AND AS A PART OF
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SECRET

PAGE 03 MBFR V 00443 02 OF 04 182013Z

THE REGULAR FORCES. THEREFORE THE 12,000 PERSONNEL ESTIMATED TO BE IN THOSE UNITS ARE INCLUDED IN WESTERN FIGURES. IF FURTHER INVESTIGATION INDICATES THAT THESE FUNCTIONS ARE IN FACT PERFORMED ONLY BY UNITS OF TERRITORIAL DEFENSE THEN THERE MIGHT HAVE TO BE AN ADJUSTMENT IN THE NATO LISTS AS FAR AS CONSCRIPT PERSONNEL OF THESE UNITS IS CONCERNED.

4. THE INQUIRY BY WESTERN NEGOTIATIONS AS TO THE ALLOCATION OF EASTERN FORCES BETWEEN CATEGORIES HAS RESULTED IN MINOR SHIFTS BETWEEN CATEGORIES IN THE SOVIET AND CZECHOSLOVAK FORCE PROFILES. THESE SHIFTS ARE REFLECTED IN THE ATTACHED SUMMARY TABLE 1 AND 2 WHICH REPRESENT REVISIONS OF THE SUMMARY TABLES 1 AND 2 CONTAINED IN THE WRITTEN REPORT OF 19 APRIL. AS THE COUNCIL WILL NOTE FROM THESE REVISED TABLES, WE HAVE AS THE RESULT OF EASTERN RESPONSES TO WESTERN QUESTIONS SHIFTED FROM THE RESIDUAL CATEGORY TO THE MAJOR FORMATIONS CATEGORY OF GROUND FORCE MANPOWER THE 1,000 MEN OF SEPARATE "TANK UNITS" (SERIAL 9, PAGE 10, MCM-86-76), AS WELL AS 2,400 MEN IN SOVIET TRAINING UNITS IN THE GDR (SERIALS 35 AND 36, PAGE 88, (MCM-86-76). THIS SHIFT IS IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE EASTERN RESPONSE AT THE JUNE 7 INFORMAL SESSION THAT ALL PERSONNEL OF TRAINING UNITS AND SUBUNITS OF SOVIET FORCES IN THE AREA ARE ASSIGNED TO ARMIES AND HAVE THEREFORE BEEN INCLUDED IN THE FIRST CATEGORY.

5. WE HAVE ALSO SHIFTED FROM AIR MANPOWER TO GROUND FORCE MANPOWER, AND SPECIFICALLY TO THE RESIDUAL CATEGORY, 1,060 SOVIET PERSONNEL IN AIR DEFENSE COMMAND AND RADAR ELEMENTS (SERIAL 3, PAGE 37, MCM-86-76). THIS SHIFT RESULTS FROM THE JUNE 7 EASTERN RESPONSE THAT PERSONNEL OF SOVIET RADAR AND COMMUNICATIONS UNITS PROVIDING SUPPORT TO BOTH GROUND AND AIR FORCES HAVE BEEN ALLOCATED TO GROUND FORCE MANPOWER. FINALLY, THE CSR MOTOR TRANSPORT BRIGADE (1,000 PERSONNEL) AND RAILROAD BRIGADE (1,500 PERSONNEL) HAS BEEN SHIFTED FROM THE RESIDUAL TO THE MAJOR FORMATION CATEGORY OF GROUND FORCE MANPOWER. THIS SHIFT RESULTS FROM EASTERN STATEMENTS THAT ALL NON-SOVIET BRIGADES

IN GENERAL ARE SUBORDINATE TO THE HEADQUARTERS OF MILITARY
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 04 MBFR V 00443 02 OF 04 182013Z

DISTRICTS.

6. WESTERN REPRESENTATIVES HAVE ALSO CONTINUED THE INQUIRY AS TO INCLUSIONS AND EXCLUSIONS IN EACH OF THE EASTERN NATIONAL FORCES. EASTERN ANSWERS HAVE THUS FAR NOT REVEALED

ANYTHING NEW, WITH THE EXCEPTION OF THE POLISH RAIL AND ROAD
CONSTRUCTION PERSONNEL NOTED ABOVE. IN SUM, BOTH THESE ASPECTS

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PAGE 01 MBFR V 00443 03 OF 04 182022Z
ACTION ACDA-12

INFO OCT-01 EUR-12 ISO-00 ACDE-00 CIAE-00 NSAE-00
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O R 181817Z JUL 78
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SECDEF WASHDC
INFO ALL MBFR MISSIONS IMMEDIATE
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AMEMBASSY ATHENS
AMEMBASSY BERLIN
AMEMBASSY BELGRADE
AMEMBASSY BERN
AMEMBASSY LISBON
AMEMBASSY LUXEMBOURG
AMEMBASSY PRAGUE
AMEMBASSY SOFIA
AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM
AMEMBASSY REYKJAVIK

S E C R E T SECTION 3 OF 4 MBFR VIENNA 0443

OF THE DATA DISCUSSION, THAT IS, ALLOCATION BETWEEN THE TWO
CATEGORIES, AND INCLUSIONS AND EXCLUSIONS IN THE OVERALL
MANPOWER OF INDIVIDUAL EASTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS, SEEM
FOR THE MOMENT TO HAVE BEEN CARRIED AS FAR AS EASTERN READI-
NESS TO RESPOND MEANINGFULLY TO WESTERN QUESTIONS PERMITS.

7. DURING THIS LATEST PHASE OF THE DATA INQUIRY FROM
MARCH TO THE PRESENT, THE EAST HAS STILL MADE NO STATEMENT
ACKNOWLEDGING THAT ITS FIGURES ARE NOT COMPLETE. TO THE
CONTRARY, IT CONTINUES TO ASSERT THAT EASTERN FIGURES ARE
COMPILED ON THE SAME BASIS AS THE WESTERN FIGURES.

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SECRET

PAGE 02 MBFR V 00443 03 OF 04 182022Z

8. EASTERN REPRESENTATIVES, FOR THEIR PART, HAVE REPEATEDLY CHALLENGED

THE WEST TO PRODUCE AND EXPLAIN ITS ESTIMATES OF WARSAW TREATY MANPOWER. THEY ARE LIKELY TO PERSIST WITH THIS CHALLENGE, PERHAPS PUBLICLY, IF THE WEST DOES NOT TABLE SOME FIGURES ON EASTERN FORCES. EASTERN PARTICIPANTS ALSO CONTINUE TO REFER TO THEIR PROPOSAL FOR AN EXCHANGE OF AVERAGE MANNING LEVELS. AS THE WEST PRESSES FOR MORE DETAILED EXAMINATION OF EASTERN FIGURES, WE MAY EXPECT THE EAST TO RESPOND BY PLACING INCREASED EMPHASIS ON THESE PROPOSALS. EASTERN PARTICIPANTS ALSO MAINTAIN THE CORRECTNESS OF THE ALLOCATION BETWEEN GROUND AND AIR MANPOWER WHICH THEY ADVOCATE REGARDING NATIONAL AIR DEFENSE PERSONNEL, AND CERTAIN HELICOPTER AND SSM PERSONNEL.

9. THE NEW EASTERN PROPOSALS OF JUNE 8 INCREASE THE FOCUS ON EAST/WEST DIFFERENCES OVER DATA. THESE EASTERN PROPOSALS ARE DIRECTLY DEPENDENT ON AGREEMENT ON DATA, IN PARTICULAR BECAUSE OF THE FACT THAT EACH SIDE WOULD HAVE TO REDUCE ITS GROUND FORCE MANPOWER BY THE AMOUNT BY WHICH THAT MANPOWER EXCEEDED THE LEVEL OF 700,000 MEN. FROM THE WESTERN STANDPOINT, THIS EASTERN ACCEPTANCE OF THE PRINCIPLE OF THE COMMON CEILING PROVIDES A CONCEPTUAL BASIS FOR ASYMMETRICAL MILITARY MANPOWER REDUCTIONS, PROVIDED THAT THE EAST CAN EVENTUALLY BE BROUGHT TO ACKNOWLEDGE THE GROUND FORCE MANPOWER DISPARITY IN ITS FAVOR.

10. IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES, THE WEST MUST DECIDE HOW TO PROCEED WITH THE DATA ISSUE. THE PRESENT LINE OF QUESTIONING HAS NEARLY RUN ITS COURSE. AS ONE POSSIBILITY, THE WEST COULD ABANDON THE DATA DISCUSSION FOR THE TIME BEING, WHILE AT THE SAME TIME MAKING IT CLEAR TO THE EAST THAT THIS RELINQUISHMENT

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 03 MBFR V 00443 03 OF 04 182022Z

IS TEMPORARY AND DOES NOT CONSTITUTE ACCEPTANCE OF THE EASTERN CONTENTION THAT APPROXIMATE PARITY EXISTS AND RESERVING THE RIGHT TO REOPEN THE DATA DISCUSSION IN THE FUTURE. THIS APPROACH WOULD LEAVE IT UP TO THE EAST TO SUGGEST WAYS TO PROCEED OR TO MAKE CHANGES IN ITS DATA POSITION. HOWEVER, THERE IS A RISK THAT, NO MATTER WHAT CAVEATS THE WEST ENTERS, THE EAST WILL CONSTRUE SUCH A WESTERN POSITION AS A MOVE TOWARD ACCEPTANCE OF ITS FIGURES. SUCH A WESTERN POSITION WOULD IN ADDITION BE DIFFICULT TO EXPLAIN TO WESTERN PUBLIC AND PARLIAMENTARY OPINION. FURTHER, THE WEST WOULD NOT BE ABLE TO INFLUENCE THE FUTURE COURSE OF THE DATA DISCUSSION.

11. FROM THE NEGOTIATING VIEWPOINT, IT WOULD SEEM FAR PREFERABLE TO MAINTAIN THE DATA INQUIRY AS A SOURCE OF PRESSURE ON THE EAST. THE EAST MAY CHOOSE NOT TO REVEAL THE FACTS EVEN IF WESTERN DATA QUESTIONS PROVE THE PRECISE AREAS WHICH DO ACCOUNT FOR THE DISCREPANCY. BUT CONTINUING THE DATA QUESTIONING MAINTAINS PRESSURE ON THE EAST TO ACKNOWLEDGE THE FACTS AND PRESERVES THE AUTHORITY OF WESTERN DATA. WESTERN REQUESTS FOR FURTHER DISAGGREGATION OF EASTERN DATA COULD INCREASE THESE PRESSURES.

12. EFFECTIVE CONTINUATION OF THE DATA INQUIRY BY THE WEST, IN THE PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES, WOULD ENTAIL MOVING INTO A MORE DETAILED EXAMINATION OF EASTERN FORCES, WITH EMPHASIS ON THOSE PORTIONS OF THE FORCES OF INDIVIDUAL EASTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS WHICH SHOW THE GREATEST DISCREPANCY IN AN EFFORT BOTH TO APPLY MORE TELLING PRESSURE ON THE EAST AND TO FIND THE REASONS FOR THAT DISCREPANCY. THE WEST COULD ALSO DEVOTE MORE EMPHASIS TO DEMONSTRATING THE INTERNAL INCONSISTENCIES OF EASTERN DATA. IT COULD REQUEST THE EAST TO PRODUCE MORE DETAILED DATA IN SPECIFIC AREAS WHICH WOULD BE OF USE BOTH IN THIS CONTEXT AND FOR PINPOINTING MORE PRECISELY JUST WHERE IN THE FORCES OF INDIVIDUAL WARASW PACT PARTICIPANTS THE GREATEST SHORTFALL CAN BE FOUND, THUS PLACING THE WEST IN A POSITION STILL MORE EFFECIVELY TO PRESS THE EAST TO RECTIFY ITS FIGURES.

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 04 MBFR V 00443 03 OF 04 182022Z

13. FOR THESE PURPOSES, THE COUNCIL MAY WISH TO CONSIDER

SECRET

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SECRET

PAGE 01 MBFR V 00443 04 OF 04 191029Z
ACTION ACDA-12

INFO OCT-01 EUR-12 ISO-00 CIAE-00 NSAE-00 NSCE-00
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AMEMBASSY LUXEMBOURG
AMEMBASSY PRAGUE
AMEMBASSY SOFIA
AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM
AMEMBASSY REYKJAVIK

S E C R E T SECTION 4 OF 4 MBFR VIENNA 0443

C O R R E C T E D C O P Y TEXT CORRECTIONS THROUGHOUT

ADDITIONAL WAYS TO CONDUCT THE DATA INQUIRY IN THE FUTURE WITH A
VIEW TO RESOLVING SATISFACTORILY THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN WESTERN
ESTIMATES OF EASTERN MANPOWER IN THE NGA AND EASTERN ASSERTIONS
CONCERNING THAT MANPOWER. AMONG THE ISSUES THAT MIGHT BE
EXAMINED ARE:

(A) WHETHER AND HOW THE WEST SHOULD PRESENT TO THE EAST CERTAIN
ELEMENTS OF WESTERN DATA ON EASTERN MANPOWER LOCATED IN THE NGA.

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 MBFR V 00443 04 OF 04 191029Z

(B) WHETHER AND HOW THE WEST SHOULD REALLOCATE DATA BETWEEN
GROUND AND AIR MANPOWER.

(C) THE TACTICAL PROBLEM POSED BY THE EASTERN PROPOSAL TO
EXCHANGE DATA ON AVERAGE MANNING LEVELS.

14. THE AD HOC GROUP ALSO WISHES TO NOTE THE NEED
FOR AGREEMENT WITHIN THE ALLIANCE ON WESTERN ESTIMATES ON
EASTERN FORCES, AS OF 1 JANUARY 1976, A QUESTION WHICH MIGHT BE
ADDRESSED BY THE MCM 86 CONFERENCE THIS FALL, IN ORDER THAT THE
ESTIMATES BE AVAILABLE IN THE EVENT THE COUNCIL WERE TO DECIDE
TO AUTHORIZE THE USE OF CERTAIN ESTIMATES WITH THE EAST.

SUMMARY TABLE 1

PROFILE OF DISCREPANCY: BY NATIONAL TOTALS FOR GROUND FORCE
AND AIR FORCE MANPOWER

DIFFERENCE			
NATO	BETWEEN	EASTERN	
ESTIMATE	EASTERN	DATA AS	
FIGURES BY	FIGURES	PERCENTAGE	

TABLED EASTERN AND NATO OF NATO
BY EAST ALLOCATION A/ ESTIMATES ESTIMATE

SOVIET 466,800 536,000 -69,200 87
GROUND 426,300 487,000 -60,700 88
AIR 40,500 49,000 - 8,500 82

CSSR 181,800 192,000 -10,200 95
GROUND 137,100 138,000 - 900 99
AIR 44,700 54,000 - 9,300 83

POLAND 215,900 288,000 -72,100 75
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 03 MBFR V 00443 04 OF 04 191029Z

GROUND 148,600 201,000 -52,400 74
AIR 67,300 87,000 -19,700 77

GDR 122,800 144,000 -21,200 85
GROUND 93,000 107,000 -14,000 87
AIR 29,800 37,000 - 7,200 81

OVERALL 987,300 1,160,000 -172,700 85
GROUND 805,000 933,000 -128,000 86
AIR 182,300 227,000 -44,700 80

A/ EXCLUDES POLISH SEA LANDING DIV; COUNTS NATIONAL AIR DEFENSE
AS AIR FORCES, GROUND SUPPORT HELICOPTER IN GROUND FORCES.

SUMMARY TABLE 2

PROFILE OF GROUND FORCE DISCREPANCY BY CATEGORY A/

DIFFERENCE
NATO BETWEEN EASTERN
ESTIMATE EASTERN DATA AS
FIGURES BY FIGURES PERCENTAGE
TABLED EASTERN AND NATO OF NATO
BY EAST ALLOCATION B/ ESTIMATES ESTIMATE

SOVIET
MAJOR FORMATIONS 344,600 433,000 -88,400 80
OTHER 81,700 54,000 PLUS 27,700 151
TOTAL 426,300 487,000 -60,700 88

CSSR
MAJOR FORMATIONS 104,700 111,000 - 6,300 94
OTHER 32,400 27,000 PLUS 5,400 120
TOTAL 137,100 138,000 - 900 99

POLAND

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 04 MBFR V 00443 04 OF 04 191029Z

MAJOR FORMATIONS	115,000	146,000	-31,000	79
OTHER	33,600	55,000	-21,400	61
TOTAL	148,600	201,000	-52,400	74

GDR

MAJOR FORMATIONS	74,100	80,000	-5,900	93
OTHER	18,900	27,000	-8,100	70
TOTAL	93,000	107,000	-14,000	87

OVERALL

MAJOR FORMATIONS	638,400	770,000	-131,600	83
OTHER	166,600	163,000	PLUS 3,600	102

805,000	933,000	128,000	86
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A/ SEE TABLES ANNEXED TO APRIL 19 REPORT FOR DETAILS ON ALLOCATION BETWEEN MAJOR FORMATIONS AND SECOND CATEGORIES, EXCEPT AS NOTED IN PRESENT REPORT.

B/ EXCLUDES NATIONAL AIR DEFENSE, POLISH SEA LANDING DIV; INCLUDES GROUND HELICOPTERS. END TEXT. DEAN

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Message Attributes

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Capture Date: 01 jan 1994
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Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 18 jul 1978
Decaption Date: 01 jan 1960
Decaption Note:
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Case Number: n/a
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TAGS: PARM, NATO, NAC
To: STATE DOD
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